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PREFACE




In November of 1988, at a Melbourne, Australia meeting of the
International Association of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) released a
policy statement entitled "Regulation of the International Securities
Markets."' The statement identified three broad areas of regulation
that should be addressed in an effective international securities mar-
ket regulatory system: efficient structures, sound disclosure systems,
and fair and honest markets. The Commission stated that: "To
achieve those objectives, securities regulators in each nation should
work closely with their foreign counterparts and seek coordinated in-
ternational solutions to world market problems."2 Significantly, the
SEC did not insist that its methods of regulation were the best or the
only means of achieving the stated goals. Instead it said:
* William W. Gurley Memorial Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law;
Former Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission (1987-1989); Trustee, Financial Ac-
counting Foundation.
1 SEC, Policy Statement on the Regulation of the International Securities Markets, Securities
Act Release No. 6807, 53 Fed. Reg. 46,963 (November 1988).
2 ld. at 5.
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In seeking solutions to common problems, securities regulators should
be sensitive to cultural differences and national sovereignty concerns.
As regulators seek to minimize differences between systems, the goal of
investor protection should be balanced with the need to be responsive to
the realities of each marketplace.3
This International Securities Regulation symposium issue of the
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business contains a
series of articles written by different authors who collectively provide
a brief history of IOSCO,4 a description on U.S. regulation of interna-
tional securities offerings,5 an assessment of the SEC's disclosure re-
quirements regarding foreign corporate governance,' an analysis of
attempts to harmonize regulation of global futures markets,7 and a
critique of the extraterritorial elements of the SEC's current securities
regulatory regime.8 These articles provide excellent insights into U.S.
regulation of international futures and securities markets, and also
provide background for an extremely important current problem: the
difficulty of reconciling U.S. accounting and disclosure standards with
international disclosure and accounting standards.
This introduction to the symposium issue will refer briefly to mat-
ters covered in the five articles but will concentrate on the problem of
reconciling U.S. and international disclosure and accounting stan-
dards. It will urge that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) coop-
erate with the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC)
for the purpose of enhancing participation in U.S. markets by foreign
issuers in an environment providing sound disclosures to investors.
'OSCO
A. A. Sommer, Jr. was a Commissioner of the SEC from 1973 to
1976. Since leaving the Commission, he has been a close observer of
the securities regulatory process, particularly in the international area.
His description regarding the transition of IOSCO from a Western
3 Id. at 5-6.
4 A.A. Sommer, Jr., IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 15
(1996).
5 Daniel A. Braverman, U.S. Legal Considerations Affecting Global Offerings of Shares in
Foreign Companies, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 30 (1996).
6 James A. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural Communicatiorn SEC Mandatory Disclo-
sure and Foreign Corporate Governance, 17 Nw. J. INV'L L. & Bus. 119 (1996).
7 Jane C. Kang, The Regulation of Global Futures Markets: Is Harmonization Possible of
Even Desirable?, 17 Nw. J. INrr'L L. & Bus. 242 (1996).
8 Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American
Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. IN'L L. & Bus. 207 (1996).
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Hemisphere forum on securities regulation to an effective world wide
organization of securities regulators provides an excellent background
regarding a body whose accomplishments are not widely known.
As Mr. Sommer indicates, IOSCO has no direct regulatory
power. Instead its effectiveness depends upon achieving agreement
among its members regarding desirable securities regulatory initia-
tives. Since 1986, when SEC Chairman John Shad urged that IOSCO
concentrate on technical securities regulatory matters,9 the organiza-
tion has increasingly been effective in providing extremely helpful
background information to its members and in launching initiatives
designed to improve world-wide securities regulation. For instance, in
1991 it published a survey of international disclosure regulation,'0 and
in 1993 it published a report discussing mechanisms for communica-
tion between market authorities during periods of market
disruption."
Despite its success in some areas, IOSCO has periodically be-
come a battleground for competing ideas in the securities regulatory
field. For instance, as Mr. Sommer reports, U.S. and European regu-
lators have tangled over questions involving capital adequacy for se-
curities firms, with the U.S. asserting the need for an approach
involving "haircuts" for liquid securities held in a firm's portfolio and
the Europeans favoring a risk based "building block" approach. That
controversy escalated into a public war of words during Richard C.
Breeden's tenure as Chairman of the SEC, and it has still not been
resolved. 12
PROBLEMS RAISED BY U.S. AccOUNTING AND
DIscLosuRE STANDARDS
An equally important unresolved problem involves the quest for
international accounting and disclosure standards. From the United
States' viewpoint, the two most important considerations are: (1)
whether foreign companies will be able to access the U.S. securities
markets for the purpose of raising capital without complying with U.
S. disclosure and accounting standards; and (2) whether U.S. investors
9 Sommer, supra note 4, at 20.
10 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SEcURTinEs COMmiSSioNS, ComPAIrvE ANALYSIS
OF DISCLOSURE REGIMES (Sept. 1991).
11 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, MECHANISMS TO EN.
HANCE OPEN AND TIMELY CoMUNICATION BETWEEN MARKET AuTHoRrrms OF RELATED
CASH AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS DUIiNG PERIODS OF MARKET DISRUPION (Oct. 1993).
12 Sommer, supra note 4, at 29-30.
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seeking to acquire foreign securities will be forced to do so in foreign
securities markets lacking adequate protective regulation.
Perhaps the most forceful advocate for relaxing U.S. disclosure
and accounting standards is the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
In a working paper,13 the Exchange complains that: "Current regula-
tory policy is unnecessarily driving business overseas at a critical time
when the world's major financial capitals are all striving to establish -
or maintain - themselves as international financial centers.'
14
The problem identified by the NYSE is extremely important. The
Exchange expects U.S. investors to double the foreign components of
their $7 trillion investment portfolio in the next few years, moving
$350 billion into foreign securities.15 It observes that there are 2,300
overseas companies that meet the Exchanges "quantitative" existing
standards and that if only a third of those were traded on the NYSE,
its market capitalization of about $5.6 trillion would double.16
The Exchange observes correctly that if the stocks of foreign
companies are not traded in the United States, U.S. investors are
likely to trade in overseas markets that are not as well regulated as the
U.S. markets. Additionally, the market activity will take place over-
seas, depriving U.S. markets of the liquidity that would be available if
that activity took place in the United States.
One reason that foreign issuers do not enter the U.S. securities
markets is the insistence by the SEC that U.S. accounting and disclo-
sure standards apply to foreign issuers seeking to sell securities in the
United States.' 7 U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(U.S. GAAP) are promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, a private non-profit organization that has authority to set U.S.
accounting standards because of the endorsement by the SEC, which
has decided to look to the private sector to establish and improve ac-
counting standards. The SEC accepts GAAP and requires that it be
13 James L Cochrane et aL, Foreign Equities and U.S. Investors: Breaking Down the Barriers
Separating Supply and Demand, New York Stock Exchange Working Paper No. 95-04 (1995)(on
fie with the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business). [hereinafter NYSE Work-
ing Paper]
14 Id. at 2.
15 Id. at 1.
16 Id. at 2. The Exchange does not discuss whether its qualitative standards, such as its cor-
porate governance standards, would be met. See generally Fanto, supra note 6, at 124. (discuss-
ing the lack of disclosure of foreign corporate governance standards and making suggestions for
change).
17 Another reason, not discussed here, is the existence of strong anti-fraud provisions in the
U.S. securities laws. These laws can be enforced by the SEC or by private litigants in class
actions seeking large damage awards.
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followed in SEC filings by U.S. issuers.' 8 See generally Miller, Red-
ding, and Bahnson, The FASB, The People, The Process and The Poli-
tics, 3rd Ed. (Richard D. Irwin Inc. 1994).19
For many foreign issuers, the problem is that U.S. GAAP im-
poses different accounting standards than exist in the country of their
domicile. Use of U.S. GAAP involves additional expense for compa-
nies desiring to sell their securities in the U.S. but, more importantly,
requires different accounting. In some cases, U.S. accounting require-
ments will produce entirely different income statements and balance
sheets.20 A second problem is that U.S. non-financial disclosure stan-
dards imposed by the SEC require much more disclosure than do for-
eign regulatory standards. As a result many foreign issuers do not
wish to comply with these different accounting and disclosure require-
ments and, therefore, are unwilling to enter the U.S. market.
One response to the view that U.S. disclosure standards are keep-
ing foreign companies from entering our markets is the observation
that eventually large foreign companies will begin to use U.S. GAAP
accounting in order to be able to enter our markets. This response
seems useful only if no means of changing U.S. disclosure or account-
ing standards without injuring U.S. investors is available.
18 The FASB is composed of seven full time board members appointed by the Financial
Accounting Foundation (FAF) to serve for no more than two five year terms. The FAF is the
parent organization of the FASB, charged with responsibility of raising funds for the FASB and
appointing its members. The FAF Board consists of 16 members who are representative of vari-
ous accounting related organizations or who are public members. The FASB is advised by the
Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC) composed of 30 members charged
with the responsibility of advising the FASB on financial issues and priorities.
19 See generally MIuLan, REDDING, AND BAHNSON, THE FASB, Tim PEOPLE, Tnm PRoCESs
AND Tim PoLmcs, 3d ed. (Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1994).
20 Edward Niestat, Internationalization of U.S. Capital Markets - The Effect of a Wide-
spread Multijurisdictiona Disclosure System on U.S. Investors, Issuers, and Exchanges (May
1993) (unpublished paper available in Northwestern University School of Law Library). Edward
Niestat discusses the problems of differential standards by referring to German accounting prac-
tices permitting hidden reserves. He states: "Of far greater concern to many foreign issuers are
U.S. GAAP standards which require the presentation of information that is not required by their
home countries' GAAP. For example, Germany permits companies to maintain reserves of un-
disclosed earnings, a practice that is strictly prohibited by U.S. GAAP. These "hidden reserves"
can be used to smooth earnings and thereby to produce a planned rather than actual profit
level". 31 Footnote 31 states: "These reserves are often quite substantial. When Daimler-Benz
AG agreed to disclose its reserves as a prelude to eventual listing on the New York Stock Ex-
change, the reserves amounted to 4 billion marks ($2.45 billion), or some 210% of its 1991 net
income (1.9 billion marks). Daimler-Benz Discloses Hidden Reserves of $2.45 Billion, Seeks Big
Board Listing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1993, at A10. After reporting these reserves, the company
reported a 25% decline in earnings. Daimler Says Mercedes Has Operating Loss, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 7, 1993, at A10.
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SEC ACCOMMODATION OF FOREIGN ISSUERS
The SEC has not been unaware of the problems faced by foreign
issuers desiring to enter the U.S. securities markets. During the last
two decades it has taken steps to accommodate entry of foreign issu-
ers into the U.S. securities markets through different disclosure re-
quirements and exemptions for companies whose securities are traded
in the United States.
For reporting purposes under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the SEC allows companies that are listed and traded on U.S.
stock exchanges or the Nasdaq stock market to file an annual report
on Form 20-F. That form permits use of home country GAAP in the
preparation of financial statements and requires a reconciliation of
material differences for U.S. GAAP, but does not require reconcilia-
tion to U.S. GAAP in certain categories.'
Companies that are not traded on a U.S. exchange or in Nasdaq22
are allowed to use the SEC Rule 12g3-2(b) 23 exemption from U.S.
reporting requirements if the issuer furnishes to the SEC whatever
information the issuer has provided to the public or to a stock ex-
change in the country of the issuer's domicile (the "home country").24
These issues can be traded on the Pink Sheets or in the NASD
OTCBB,25 but these quotation media do not provide active trading
markets.
If a company wishes to distribute its securities publicly in the U.S.
through a registration statement filed under the Securities Act of
1933, the SEC permits use of forms similar to Forms S-1, S-2, and S-3
used for U.S. corporations. Form F-3, which incorporates Form 20-F
21 Differences exist between disclosures for reporting purposes and disclosures for public
offerings of securities. Form 20-F, 17 C.F.R. §249.220f, has two sets of financial statement re-
quirements, in Item 17 and Item 18. Item 17 contains the minimum disclosure requirements, and
contains significant exceptions from SEC requirements for reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, while
Item 18 requires reconciliation with U.S. GAAP. Foreign issuers are permitted to use Item 17 in
Form 20-F annual reports, but Item 18 must be followed if Form 20-F filings are to be incorpo-
rated by reference in Form F-3 filings in connection with distributions of securities. See Frost &
Kinney, Disclosure Choices of Foreign Registrants in the United States, 34 JOURNAL OF Ac-
COUNMNG RESEARCH 67 (1996).
22 Companies traded on an exchange must register under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 §12(b), 15. U.S.C. §781(b). Companies traded on the Nasdaq Stock Market ("an auto-
mated inter-dealer quotation system") are excluded from use of Rule 12g3-2(b) by Rule 12g3-
2(d)(3).
23 17 C.F.R. §240.12g3-2(b). [hereinafter regulations are referred to as rules]
24 See Rule 12g3-2; see also Braverman, supra note 5, at 101.
25 The OTCBB is the NASD's over the counter bulletin board market, which provides screen
based quotations, but no trading system. The Pink Sheets are published by the National Quota-
tion Bureau and also do not provide a trading system.
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disclosures by reference, can be used if the issuers 20-F reports are
current, if issuers meets a float test of $75 million, and if the issuer has
not defaulted on certain payments. However, if the company plans a
public offering of securities it must also provide a reconciliation2 6 of
its financial statements to U.S. GAAP.27 Thus, since a public offering
of securities cannot be made by a foreign issuer without reconciliation
with U.S. GAAP, access to the U.S. markets for the sale of securities
is highly limited.
Regarding disclosures, the U.S. has made some adjustments by
foregoing certain compensation disclosures and allowing foreign issu-
ers to report on a semiannual rather than quarterly basis.28 It also has
exempted foreign private issuers from the short swing profit and
proxy regulation.29 In a recent release dealing with simplification of
registration and reporting requirements for foreign registrants, the
SEC enumerated areas in which it has provided accommodations to
foreign issuers, including the following:
einterim reporting on the basis of home country regulatory and stock
exchange practices;
* quarterly reports are not required from foreign issuers;
eexemption from the proxy rules and Section 16 insider stock reports
and short-swing profit recovery;
-executive compensation disclosure requirements that allow disclosure
of compensation for executives on an aggregate basis, if so reported in
the issuer's home country; and
*offering document financial statements that are required to be updated
principally on a semi-annual, rather than quarterly, basis3 °
By the adoption of Rule 144A under the Securities Act in April
of 1990, the SEC provided a means for foreign issuers to access the
U.S. institutional investor market.31 Rule 144A provides that sales of
securities eligible under the rule to qualified institutional buyers32 will
be exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
26 Braverman, supra note 5, at 40. Braverman points out that reconciliation can yield impor-
tant differences, noting that for the year 1991, net income for BET, a U.K. company was £150.0
million under U.K. GAAP and only £77 million under U.S. GAAP. Id. at n.16. (?check?)
27 Complying with Item 18 in Form 20-F; see also id at 39.
28 Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign Companies, Se-
curities Act Release No. 33-7053, 59 Fed. Reg. 21,644 (April 19, 1994)(adopting amendments to
Form 20-F and other rules).
29 SEC Rule 3a12-3(b), exempting foreign private issuers as defined by Rule 3b-4 from Sec-
tions 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), and 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Exemption from
tender offer regulation under Section 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e) is not provided.
30 Securities Act Release No. 33-7053, supra note 28.
31 Braverman, supra note 5, at 68-73.
32 As defined in Rule 144A(a)(3) as an institutional investor that owns and invests on a
discretionary basis $100 million in securities.
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1933. Braverman reports that as of December 31, 1993, 191 foreign
companies had raised $23.415 billion in the Rule 144A market.3
Although under Rule 144A a private market for foreign securities
exists among U.S. institutional investors, the SEC does not allow Rule
144A to be used for securities that are of the same class as securities
traded on a national securities exchange or traded on a U.S. auto-
mated inter-dealer quotation system. 4 The SEC has rejected creation
of a separate private market paralleling a public market in part be-
cause such a market might have the effect of denying small investors
the liquidity resulting from market participation by institutional inves-
tors. Additionally, artificial separation of markets for the same securi-
ties would have unknown effects on price discovery.
If the SEC continues to object to parallel institutional and public
markets, increased use of a Rule 144A market will not be available to
bring large public companies into U.S. markets. In recent years, the
SEC has been more accommodating to foreign issuers, in part through
the Form 20-F and 12g3-2(b) initiatives, and also through its promul-
gation of Rule 144A.35 More could be done by the SEC to accommo-
date foreign issuers by further relaxing disclosure standards and
permitting deviations from U.S. GAAP.
MULTPURISDICTIONAL DIscLosuRE
In 1991, the SEC completed the first phase of its "multijurisdic-
tional disclosure" project, which resulted in an agreement between the
SEC and Canadian securities regulatory officials to permit the use of
home country documents in certain securities offerings. 36 The agree-
ment rested on the premise that Canadian and U.S. accounting, disclo-
sure, supervisory, and enforcement standards are so similar that each
country's documents can be used in the other country without harm to
investors. Although this approach was promising for Canada, in most
other foreign jurisdictions the multijurisdictional disclosure model will
not work, precisely because of differences between the regulatory sys-
tems in the U.S. and those countries, particularly in the accounting
and disclosure areas.
33 Braverman, supra note 5, at 66. (citing the SEC Staff Report on Rule 144A).
34 Rule 144A (d)(3)(i).
35 Regulation S might also be included in this discussion, since it relaxes SEC restrictions on
sales of foreign securities to U.S. citizens overseas. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 8, at 208-13
(critical discussion of Regulation S); see also Braverman, supra note 5, at 90-102.
36 Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and Report-
ing System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 33-6902, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (June
21, 1991).
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In the article "The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Se-
curities Law" contained in this issue Stephen Choi and Andrew Guz-
man advance the concept of "portable reciprocity" as a means of
solving the problem inherent in different accounting and disclosure
systems.3 7 They note that reciprocity agreements such as the one be-
tween U.S. and Canadian authorities "leave it up to the individual
country whether to be governed by the host country's or its own coun-
try's laws," but advance a solution based on company choice, stating:
Rather than requiring that companies adhere to the regime of their
home country, companies would be allowed to select from the regime of
any country of their choosing. Such a system would add increased issuer
mobility in addition to investor mobility. To the extent an issuer disliked
the regulations of a particular regime, they could simply switch to an-
other country's regime.38
As Messrs. Choi and Guzman point out, in response to conten-
tions that each issuer should be governed by the disclosure rules of its
own country rather than by the rules of the country in which it desires
to sell or trade its securities, former SEC Chairman Richard C.
Breeden replied: "[I]f the SEC were to adopt a system of home coun-
try exemptions, the U.S. investors would be confronted even today
with financial statements prepared under at least forty different sets of
accounting principles. 39 Surely Chairman Breeden was correct as to
home country choice. The SEC has rejected that approach and would
surely reject a system based on company choice as suggested by Choi
and Guzman. Such a system would make compatibility between dis-
closure and accounting systems very unlikely, and would probably
cause some issuers to choose the systems with the lowest disclosure
and accounting requirements.
The willingness of Choi and Guzman to urge the portable reci-
procity idea seems to stem from notions that investors can become
informed about the effectiveness of a particular disclosure system and
will then protect themselves in their investment decision making. They
state:
Moreover, American investors are sufficiently well-protected if they un-
derstand that they are purchasing securities under a legal regime that
differs from that of the United States. With this knowledge, investors can
decide whether the risks are worth taking and how much they are willing
to pay for a particular security.40
37 Choi & Guzman, supra note 8, at 227.
38 Id. at 228-29.
39 Id. at 228. (quoting from Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Economic
Transformation, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L U. 577, 590 (1994)).
40 It at 219.
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This underlying attitude toward information and decision making
seems misguided and is not likely to be embraced by regulators who
understand that most investors need to be protected against judg-
ments made without adequate information. It is difficult to imagine
how an investor would be able to judge the effectiveness of different
regulatory regimes, much less quantify that knowledge in a manner
allowing the investor to change the purchasing or selling price of a
particular security.
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
The most important and encouraging, yet controversial, develop-
ment involves international accounting standards being promulgated
by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). IASC
"is an independent private sector body, with the objective of achieving
uniformity in the accounting principles which are used by businesses
and other organizations for financial reporting around the world."'"
The IASC's announced goal is to develop accounting standards that
can be accepted worldwide. It has made great progress in that
direction.42
In the early days of IASC, little tension existed between the
IASC standards setters and the U.S. standards setters. Throughout
the existence of the IASC, the FASB has sent representatives to IASC
meetings as members of the U.S. delegation serving as observers, and
the SEC has also sent observers to IASC meetings. However, as
IASC has come nearer to completion of its project to develop interna-
41 IASC, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDs, at 7 (1996). IASC was formed in 1973,
and since 1983 its members have included all of the professional accountancy bodies that are
members of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). Other organizations are also
involved in the work of IASC. Its Board is composed of representatives of accountancy bodies
in 13 countries and three accountancy organizations with interests in financial reporting. Each
Board member may nominate two representatives and a technical advisor to attend Board meet-
ings. For terms ending December 31, 1997, the Board will consist of 13 countries, including the
United States, and representatives of three financial accounting organizations. A Consultative
Group composed of representatives of 15 international organizations of preparers and users of
financial statements, stock exchanges and securities regulators meets twice yearly to discuss tech-
nical issues with the Board. An Advisory Council was established in 1995 for the purpose of
reviewing the independence and objectivity of the Board. The IASC Board is supported by a
small technical staff located in London, consisting of approximately 3 to 5 professionals acting
under the direction of the IASC Secretary-General and the supervision of its Technical Director.
Most of the IASC projects are completed through the work of steering committees of part time
volunteers who study projects selected by the IASC Board and prepare a draft statement of
principles for public comment. Subsequently a statement of principals or an exposure draft will
be presented by the steering committee to the Board for review and eventual vote.
42 See FASB, THE IASC-U.S. CONMARISON PRojE=c. A REPORT ON TH SnMuLARrrrns AND
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IASC STANDARDS AND U.S. GAAP (Claire Bloomer ed., 1996).
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tional accounting standards, questions have arisen regarding the inter-
relationship between proposed IASC standards and U.S. GAAP.
The most public aspect of differences between the IASC stan-
dards and standard setters and the GAAP standards and standard set-
ters occurred in a series of exchanges between IOSCO and the IASC.
As Mr. Sommer reports,43 in 1993, IOSCO indicated that it would
withhold action on individual IASC standards until IASC had com-
pleted action on all of its "core" principles. In 1994, the then Chair-
man of IASC raised the question whether IOSCO intended to accept
the process of setting international standards by IASC or whether it
would review in detail each of the IASC standards before approving
them. According to Mr. Sommer, the controversy was resolved in
1995 by an agreement that by 1999 IASC would develop a core set of
principles that IOSCO could then endorse for cross-border capital
raising and listing purposes.44
The IASC-IOSCO agreement in turn raised questions whether
the SEC, a principal participant in the affairs of IOSCO, would agree
to recognize IASC standards. According to Mr. Sommer, after IASC
announced that it would expedite its completion of the core principles
to March of 1998, the SEC applauded IASC for accelerating the date,
but stated that those principles would be acceptable to the SEC "only
if they constituted a comprehensive, generally accepted basis of ac-
counting, were of high quality that would result in compatibility and
transparency and provided for full disclosure and were rigorously in-
terpreted and applied."'45
The SEC's expressed reservation makes it seem unlikely that the
IASC principles will be embraced in full by the SEC as acceptable
substitutes for U.S. GAAP. Although IASC standards are in many
respects comparable to U.S. GAAP, they are not presented in the
same detail as U.S. GAAP and they are not surrounded with the ex-
tensive interpretations of the type issued by the FASB.
Despite the likelihood that the SEC will not accept IASC stan-
dards as a substitute for U.S. GAAP, room for optimism remains.
The essential thrust of the IASC project is that IASC will promulgate
accounting principles that have world wide approval. These standards
can then become the starting point for national regulation. Hopefully,
the SEC and FASB will continue to cooperate with IASC for the pur-
pose of achieving agreement between the U.S. and IASC concerning
43 Sommer, supra note 4.
44 Id. at 28.
45 Id.
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the substance of the IASC principles. This cooperation should include
willingness by the SEC and FASB to reexamine U.S. accounting prin-
ciples to see whether in some instances the U.S. can change its princi-
ples so that they parallel IASC principles. If a common set of broad
principles can be agreed to, nothing prevents the SEC from requiring
only narrative reconciliation to U.S. GAAP or limiting requirements
for numerical reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.46 Additionally, the SEC
could review its disclosure standards to determine whether there are
additional disclosures required in the U.S. that can be omitted by for-
eign issuers.47
One method of encouraging large companies to enter the U.S.
securities markets would be to define a special group of "world-class"
companies that would be entitled to use home country documents "as
long as they included a written explanation of any material differences
between home country accounting practices and U.S. GAAP. '48 This
solution presumably would not require numerical reconciliation be-
tween U.S. GAAP and home country accounting standards and would
be justified on the theory that the companies involved would be so
widely followed by securities analysts world wide that comparability
of financial statements would necessarily evolve.
The world class company solution might be defended on efficient
market theory. The semi-strong form of the efficient market theory
presumes that all historic and public information about a widely fol-
lowed company reaches the market through the activities of analysts
and investors, and that the market price of a security reflects all of this
information.49 Some advocates of the theory believe that companies
acting in their own best interest will release all material information
about themselves. Others believe they will not do so and believe that
the theory depends upon a forced disclosure regime such as that ad-
ministered by the SEC. To the extent that information is not volunta-
46 As it now does in Form 20-F. Form 20-F currently refers to several IASC standards as
starting points, including IAS 7 regarding statements of cash flow (Item 17(c)(2)(iii)); IAS 21,
dealing with changes in foreign exchange rates (Item 17(c)(2)(iv)(B) and Item 18(c)(2)(iv)(B)
and (C)); and IAS 22, dealing with amortization of goodwill (Item 17(c)(viii) and Item18(e)(viii)).
47 Cochrane et al., supra note 13, at 15.
48 Id. The NYSE Working Paper suggests several methods of opening U.S. markets to for-
eign issuers. In addition to urging special status for world class issuers, it suggests expanding
markets for sophisticated investors and urges changing SEC disclosure standards, expanding the
SEC's Multijurisdictional disclosure project, and accepting accounting standards promulgated by
the International Accounting Standards Committee.
49 See Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.FN.
383 (1970).
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rily provided by companies, differences in required disclosures in
various countries will result in differential disclosure, making it diffi-
cult for analysts and investors to compare companies.
The possibility that special disclosure and accounting standards
might exist for world class companies should not be discarded without
extensive consideration. Certainly questions of cost in preparing rec-
onciliations of IASC standards and U.S. GAAP should not be impor-
tant to world class issuers. Additionally, a study of the areas of
disclosure that are disturbing to international issuers might well reveal
that U.S. world class issuers would not adamantly seek equal treat-
ment 50 if disclosures in these areas were required of U.S. issuers and
not of foreign issuers. Although some suggest that identifying world
class issuers would be difficult, no reason exists why classification
based on revenues, assets, or market float as of a particular date such
as the end of the calendar year could not be used to establish the
members of the class for the coming year.
Underlying the possible disagreements about standards are possi-
ble disagreements about procedures. It seems extremely unlikely that
the SEC will abandon jurisdiction over its accounting and disclosure
standard setting process to IASC or any international body. More
likely, and hopefully, the FASB will provide technical cooperation
with the IASC standard setting process so that IASC standards and
FASB standards will not differ markedly. Both the IASC and the
FASB will benefit by compatible rather than differing standards. The
SEC should encourage this process. The SEC has been a leader in
international securities cooperative efforts, at least, since the time of
its 1988 Melbourne release. No reason appears why it should aban-
don its cooperative attitude now.
In her article "The Regulation of Global Futures Markets: Is
Harmonization Possible or Even Desirable?" in this issue,5' Jane
Kang identifies the problem facing market regulators attempting to
coordinate their regulation. She identifies that problem as that of
choosing between "reputational risk" - a potential consequence of ac-
celerating the commencement of market operations with an underde-
veloped or inadequate financial infrastructure - and "market share
risk" - concern that other more mature and liquid markets or less
50 Presumably U.S. world class issuers could continue to follow U.S. GAAP, perhaps ex-
plaining on a narrative or even a reconciliation basis what changes in results would occur if
IASC standards were followed.
51 Kang, supra note 7.
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prudent regulation will initiate trading and that volume may never mi-
grate home.52
Ms. Kang has identified a real concern for U.S. market regula-
tors. Should regulatory standards be relaxed in order to attract foreign
issuers to the U.S. markets? Will failure to relax those standard result
in permanent loss of opportunity? Can those standards be relaxed in
a manner that will continue to provide ample protection for U.S. in-
vestors? In the area of accounting and disclosure regulation, the
FASB and the SEC have an opportunity to examine these questions in
order to determine what steps can be taken to optimize both market
participation and investor protection. Given the past U.S. coopera-
tion in IOSCO and with the IASC, continued attention to these ques-
tions seems likely. Hopefully, positive results will emerge.
52 Id. at 248.
